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Abstract - People cannot prevent personal information from
being collected by various actors. Several security measures are
implemented on servers to minimize the possibility of a privacy
violation. Unfortunately, even the most well defended servers are
subject to attacks and however much one trusts a hosting organ-
ism/company, such trust does not last forever. We propose a sim-
ple and practical degradation model where sensitive data under-
goes a progressive and irreversible degradation from an accurate
state at collection time, to intermediate but still informative fuzzy
states, to complete disappearance. We introduce the data degrada-
tion model and identify related technical challenges and open issues.
I. INTRODUCTION
People give personal data explicitly all the time to insur-
ance companies, hospitals, banks, and employers. Implicitly,
cell phones give location information, cookies give browsing
information and RFID tags may give information even more
continuously. The data ends up in a database somewhere,
where it can be queried for various purposes. Many people
believe that they have lost all control of the usage made of
their personal data and consider the situation as unavoidable.
Several solutions have been proposed to combat this pri-
vacy invasion and violation, extending the traditional access
control management [6] towards usage control. Hippocratic
databases [9] are a good representative of this approach where
the donor's consent is collected along with the data and this
consent grants permission to execute only predefined operations
(i.e., usages) aiming at satisfying predefined purposes. While
this approach offers a way to express privacy goals, its effec-
tiveness relies on the trust put on the organization managing the
data. Unfortunately, even the most secure servers (including
those of Pentagon, FBI and NASA) are subject to attacks [3].
Beyond computer security, the trust dilemma regarding the
hosting of personal records encompasses government requests
and business practices. Typically, search engine companies
have been urged by governments to disclose personal infor-
mation about people suspected of crime, terrorism and even
dissidence. Today, U.S. and E.U. regulators show important
concerns about the Google-DoubleClick merging considering
the unprecedented amount of information that can be gathered
about the Internet activities of consumers [12]. The privacy
policy that will apply after the merging to the personal data
previously acquired by each partner is also questionable. Thus,
however how much one trusts a hosting company, this trust
can be reconsidered over time.
Existing approaches to answer these concerns rely on ano-
nymizing the data when it complies with the acquisition pur-
pose or on attaching a retention limit to the data storage. Data
anonymization [7],[11] helps, but the more the data is ano-
nymized, the less usage remains possible, introducing a tricky
balance between application reach and privacy [10]. Besides,
correctly anonymizing the data is a hard problem [2], espe-
cially when considering incremental data sets or if back-
ground knowledge is taken into account [1]. The disclosure of
insufficiently anonymized data published by AOL about Web
search queries conducted by 657,000 Americans exemplifies
this [4]. Limited retention attaches a lifetime compliant with
the acquisition purpose to the data, after which it must be
withdrawn from the system. When the data retention limit is
not fixed by the legislation, it is supposed to reflect the best
compromise between user and company interests. In practice,
the all-or-nothing behaviour implied by limited data retention
leads to the overstatement of the retention limit every time a
data is collected to serve different purposes [9]. As a conse-
quence, retention limits are usually expressed in terms of years
and are seen by civil rights organizations as a deceitful justifica-
tion for long term storage ofpersonal data by companies.
The approach proposed in this paper opens up a new alter-
native to protect personal data over time. It is based on the
assumption that long lasting purposes can often be satisfied
with a less accurate, and therefore less sensitive, version of
the data. In our data degradation model, called Life Cycle
Policy (LCP) model, data is stored accurately for a short pe-
riod, such that services can make full use of it, then degraded
on time progressively decreasing the sensibility of the data,
until complete removal from the system. Thus, the objective is
to progressively degrade the data after a given time period so
that (1) the intermediate states are informative enough to serve
application purposes and (2) the accurate state cannot be re-
covered by anyone after this period, not even by the server.
The expected benefit is threefold:
. Increased privacy wrt disclosure: the amount of accurate
personal information exposed to disclosure (e.g., after an
attack, a business alliance or a governmental pressure) de-
pends on the degradation policy but is always less than with
a traditional data retention principle.
. Increased security wrt attacks: to be effective, an attack
targeting a database running a data degradation process must
be repeated with a frequency smaller than the duration of the
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shortest degradation step. Such continuous attacks are easily
detectable thanks to Intrusion Detection and Auditing Systems.
Increased usability wrt application: compared to data ano-
nymization, data degradation applies to attributes describ-
ing a recorded event while keeping the identity of the donor
intact. Hence, user-oriented services can still exploit the in-
formation to the benefit of the donor. Compared to data re-
tention, data degradation steps are defined according to the
targeted application purposes and the retention period in
each step is defined according to privacy concerns. Then,
degrading the data rather than deleting it offers a new com-
promise between privacy preservation and application reach.
Hence, data degradation should be considered as a new tool
complementary to access control, anonymization and data
retention to help better protect the privacy of personal records,
with a significant expected impact on the amount of sensitive
information exposed to attacks and misuses.
An important question is whether data degradation can be
reasonably implemented in a DBMS. As pointed out in [8],
even guaranteeing that data cannot be recovered after a regu-
lar delete as performed by traditional databases is not easy.
Indeed, every trace of deleted data must be physically cleaned
up in the data store, the indexes and the logs. Data degradation
is a more complex process which includes physical data dele-
tion but impacts more thoroughly the data storage, indexation,
logging and locking mechanisms to deal with data traversing a
sequence of states of accuracies.
We propose below a simple and effective data degradation
model, identify the technical challenges and outline some
open issues.
II. LCP DEGRADATION MODEL
In our data degradation model, data is subject to a progres-
sive degradation from the accurate state to intermediate less
detailed states, up to disappearance from the database. The
degradation of each piece of information (typically an attrib-
ute) is captured by a Generalization Tree. Given a domain
generalization hierarchy [5] for an attribute, a generalization
tree (GT) for that attribute gives, at various levels of accuracy,
the values that the attribute can take during its lifetime (see
Figure 1). Hence, a path from a particular node to the root of
the GT expresses all degraded forms the value of that node
can take in its domain. Furthermore, for simplicity we assume
that for each domain there is only one GT.
A life cycle policy (LCP) governs the degradation process
by fixing how attribute values navigate from the GT leaves up
to the root. While we may consider complex life cycle policies
where state transitions are triggered by events, combine dif-
ferent attributes and are user defined, we adopt the following
simplifying assumptions:
Fig. 1 Generalization tree of the location domain.
d0 d1 d2 d3 d4
ddres ity Rgion county:
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Fig 2. An example of an attribute's LCP.
. LCPs express degradation triggered by time
. LCPs are defined per degradable attribute
. LCPs apply to all tuples of the same data store uniformly
A Life Cycle Policy for an attribute is modelled by a de-
terministic finite automaton as a set of degradable attribute
states {d0,. ..,d denoting the levels of accuracy of the corre-
sponding attribute d, a set of transitions between those states
and the associated time delays (TP) after which these transi-
tions are triggered. The following figure shows an example of
a LCP defined for the location attribute.
A tuple is a composition of stable attributes which do not
participate in the degradation process and degradable attrib-
utes. The combination of LCPs of all degradable attributes
makes that, at each independent attribute transition, the tuple
as a whole reaches a new tuple state tk, until all degradable
attributes have reached their final state. A tuple LCP is thus
derived from the combination of each individual attributes'
LCP (see Figure 3).
Fig. 3 Tuple LCP based on attribute LCP
Due to degradation, the dataset DS is divided into subsets
STk of tuples within the same tuple state tk, having a strong
impact on the selection and projection operators of queries.
These operators have to take accuracy into account, and have
to return a coherent and well defined result. To achieve this
goal, data subject to a predicate P expressed on a demanded
accuracy level k, will be degraded before evaluating P, using a
degradation function fk (based on the generalization tree(s)).
Given f, P and k, we define the select and project operators
0P,k and 21*,k as:
UP, k (DS) = up fk )USTj ) *,k (DS) = z(fk U STi
The accuracy level k is chosen such that it reflects the de-
clared purpose for querying the data. Then, queries can be
expressed with no change on the SQL syntax as illustrated
below:
DECLARE PURPOSE STAT SET ACCURACY LEVEL COUNTRY
FOR P.LOCATION, RANGE1000 FOR P.SALARY
SELECT * FROM PERSON WHERE LOCATION LIKE"%FRANCE%"
AND SALARY = '2000-3000'
The semantics of update queries is as follows: delete query
semantic is unchanged compared to a traditional database,
except for the selection predicates which are evaluated as ex-
plained above. Thus, the delete semantics is similar to the
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deletion through SQL views. When a tuple is deleted, both
stable and degradable attributes are deleted. We made the as-
sumptions that insertions of new elements are granted only in
the most accurate state. Finally, we make the assumption that
updates of degradable attributes are not granted after the tuple
creation has been committed. On the other hand, updates of
stable attributes are managed as in a traditional database.
III. TECHNICAL CHALLENGES
Whenever an extension is proposed to a database model,
and whatever the merits of this extension is, the first and le-
gitimate question which comes in mind is how complex will
the technology be to support it. Identifying the impact of mak-
ing a DBMS data-degradation aware leads to several impor-
tant questions briefly discussed below:
How does data degradation impact transaction semantics?
User transaction inserting tuples with degradable attributes
generates effects all along the lifetime of the degradation
process, that is from the transaction commit up to the time
where all inserted tuples have reached a final LCP state for all
their degradable attributes. This significantly impacts transac-
tion atomicity and durability and even isolation considering
potential conflicts between degradation steps and reader trans-
actions.
How to enforce timely data degradation?
Degradation updates, as well as final removal from the da-
tabase have to be timely enforced. As pointed out in [8], tradi-
tional DBMSs cannot even guarantee the non-recoverability
of deleted data due to different forms of unintended retention
in the data space, the indexes and the logs. In our context, the
problem is particularly acute considering that each tuple in-
serted in the database undergoes as many degradation steps as
tuple states. The storage of degradable attributes, indexes and
logs have thus to be revisited in this light.
How to speed up queries involving degradable attributes?
Traditional DBMSs have been designed to speed up either
OLTP or OLAP applications. OLTP workloads induce the
need of few indexes on the most selective attributes to get the
best trade-off between selection performance and inser-
tion/update/deletion cost. By contrast, in OLAP workloads,
insertions are done off-line, queries are complex and the data
set is very large. This leads to multiple indexes to speed up even
low selectivity queries thanks to bitmap-like indexes. Data deg-
radation can be useful in both contexts. However, data degrada-
tion changes the workload characteristics in the sense that
OLTP queries become less selective when applied to degrad-
able attributes and OLAP must take care of updates incurred by
degradation. This introduces the need for indexing techniques
supporting efficiently degradation.
IV. CONCLUSION
The life cycle policy model is a promising new privacy
model. Data degradation provides guarantees orthogonal and
complementary to those brought by traditional security ser-
vices. A clear and intuitive semantics has been defined for this
model and related technical challenges have been identified.
In this model, we consider that state transitions are fired at
predetermined time intervals and apply to all tuples of the
same table uniformly. However, other forms of data degrada-
tion make sense and could be the target of future work. For
instance, state transitions could be caused by events like those
traditionally captured by database triggers. They could also be
conditioned by predicates applied to the data to be degraded.
In addition, since users do not have the same perception of
their privacy, letting paranoid users defining their own LCP
makes sense.
To answer a query expressed on a tuple state, we chose to
consider only the subset of tuples for which this state is com-
putable, thus making the semantics of the query language un-
ambiguous and intuitive. However, more complex query se-
mantics could be devised. In particular, selection predicates
expressed at a given accuracy could also be evaluated on tu-
ples exhibiting a lower accuracy. In addition, qualified tuples
for which the projected attributes reveal a weaker accuracy
than expected by the query could be projected on the most
accurate computable value.
Finally, we proscribe insertions and updates in states other
than the most accurate. This choice was motivated by avoid-
ing the fuzziness incurred by allowing users modifying "past
events". However, modifying degraded tuples may make
sense when, for instance, incorrect values have been collected.
This paper is a first attempt to lay the foundation of future
data degradation enabled DBMS. It introduces a set of new
problems ranging from the defmition of the degradation
model up to the optimization of the DBMS engine, opening up
an exciting research agenda.
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